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Residents' Property Tax Exemptions: A Modern
Analysis Under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause
Glen A. Sankee*
I.

Introduction

State tax preferences for residents must be examined to see
whether they discriminate against similarly situated nonresidents in
a constitutionally impermissible manner. Statutes affording different
classes of taxpayers disparate tax treatment based on residency may
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of
the United States Constitution. However, since the Supreme Court
has not held nonresidency a suspect classification, discrimination
against nonresidents is generally justified under the equal protection
clause if it is rationally related to the furtherance of some legitimate
state interest.
Statutes which discriminate against nonresidents may also violate the privileges and immunities clause. That clause is generally
considered more powerful than the equal protection clause in combatting discrimination against nonresidents because the state must
justify its action under a considerably more rigorous standard of review than a search for mere rationality. Recently, however, the
Supreme Court said that the privileges and immunities clause protects only fundamental rights of nonresidents and upheld a discriminatory fee imposed on nonresidents' recreational activities in the
state. As a result, divergent views have developed concerning the
validity of statutory tax preferences afforded residents for their permanent homes but denied to nonresident taxpayers for their vacation
homes within the state. This article examines the constitutionality of
state tax statutes that discriminate against nonresidents and their
recreational properties. It suggests that the breadth of nonresidents'
rights to equal taxation is largely undefined, but that exemptions for
a taxpayer's principal residence may pass constitutional muster if the
*
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tax preferences are merely incidental to residency status and do not
hinge on it.
II. The Legal Questions
Until recently, the proscriptions of the privileges and immunities clause' pertaining to the states' taxing power were reasonably
well settled. While states have always had broad taxing powers, 2 a
tax which discriminated against nonresidents had to be reasonably
related to achieving substantial equality under the tax scheme
viewed as a whole,3 or justified by valid independent reasons. 4 Valid
independent reasons for discrimination against nonresidents did not
exist unless it was demonstrated that nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute was aimed and that there
was a reasonable relationship between the danger presented by nonresidents as a class and the discrimination practiced upon them. 5
In 1978, an added dimension to the law of privileges and immunities emerged in Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of Montana.6 In
that case, the Supreme Court resurrected a principle that some
thought had been discarded decades earlier 7 and held that the privileges and immunities clause protects only fundamental or natural
rights of nonresidents.
Among the rights always regarded as "fundamental" were the
rights to own property, to pursue one's livelihood or common commercial calling, and to be "exempt from higher taxes or impositions
than are paid by the other citizens of the state."8 However, cases
involving discriminatory taxes on nonresidents' commercial activities
1 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl.1, provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
2 See, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
3 Eg., Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Travellers' Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364 (1902).
4 Such a justification is not required with respect to rights that are uniquely tied to an
individual's identification with a particular state. See, e.g., Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891
(1974) (qualifications for elective state office); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting
rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (entitlement to state services).
5 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
6 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
7 The view of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), that the privileges and immunities clause protects "fundamental" or
"natural" rights, was replaced by the view expressed in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org.
307 U.S. 496 (1939). See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra. However, United Building &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984), reaffirmed Baldwin's
holding that only fundamental rights are protected.
8 Corftld, 6 F. Cas. at 552.
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or properties within the state9 provide little guidance in determining,
first, whether a nonresident's right to be exempt from higher taxes on
recreational property must be a fundamental right under the privileges and immunities clause, and second, whether it is in fact such a
right. While these particular questions were not involved in Baldwin,
some state courts have cited it as authority for upholding discriminatory taxes under the privileges and immunities clause where nonresidents' recreational properties were involved. 10 Other cases seem to
support that result."
III.

History of the Privileges and Immunities Clause

The guarantee of privileges and immunities first appeared in the
fourth article of the Articles of Confederation. 2 In the Constitution,
9 See, for example, Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1870), which was applied to invalidate discriminatory taxes and license fees in several subsequent cases: (1) a Tennessee annual
privilege tax of $100 on nonresident construction companies as compared to $25 for resident
construction companies, Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 522 (1919); (2) a
South Carolina license fee for shrimp boats on coastal waters of $2,500 for nonresidents, but
only $25 for residents, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); and (3) an Alaska fishing fee of
$50 for nonresidents and $5 for residents, Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952).
10 See, e.g., Rubin v. Glaser, 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382 (1980) (nonresident denied a
rebate of ad valorem property taxes that he paid on his vacation home, rebate available to
residents for taxes paid on their homesteads); Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979)
(statutory scheme providing for refunds from the state general fund only to resident renters
and homeowners did not deal with fundamental rights).
I1 See, e.g., Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities, 651 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1981) (higher fees for mooring recreational boats of nonresidents did not involve fundamental
rights, and therefore would not violate the privileges and immunities clause); In re Estate of
Greenberg, 390 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1980) (right of a nonresident to act as personal representative
of a Florida estate was not a fundamental right for purposes of the privileges and immunities
clause, even though a fee would be earned); Northwest Gillnetters Ass'n v. Sandison, 95
Wash. 2d 638, 628 P.2d 800 (1981) (discrimination against sport fisherman held not to involve
fundamental rights); Dirksen v. Clark, No. 82-2168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. filed Oct. 19, 1982)
(Florida Department of Revenue argued that any right of nonresidents to an exemption from
higher ad valorem taxes on tangible personal property used in connection with their vacation
homes is not "fundamental" and that, under Baldwin, it is not protected by the privileges and
immunities clause) (decision pending Florida Supreme Court review of same issue in Herzog
v. Colding, 437 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); oral arguments were heard in Herzog on
Apr. 2, 1984).
12 That Article provided:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the
people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these
states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to
all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of
each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties,
impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided, that
such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property, im-
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those principles appeared in the commerce clause 13 and the privileges
and immunities clause. Because of their common origin, reference to
the commerce clause and the authorities which shaped its contours
through the wear of litigation is common when interpreting and applying the privileges and immunities clause.1 4 The difference in the
purpose and scope of the clauses, however, was addressed by the
Court in Ward v. Mayland.'5
In Ward, a New Jersey resident was convicted in a Maryland
criminal court of violating a state statute that required nonresidents,
but not residents, to purchase a license before selling merchandise in
that state. The Supreme Court characterized the license fee in Ward
as a form of tax and examined its discriminatory effect under both
the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause. The
Court noted that states have broad powers to lay and collect taxes,
but that
taxes levied by a State .

.

. may, perhaps, be so excessive and

unjust in respect to the citizens of the other States as to violate
that provision [Article IV. Section 2, Clause 1] of the
Constitution ...
Grant that the States may impose discriminating taxes
against the citizens of other States, and it will soon be found that
the power conferred upon Congress to regulate interstate commerce is of no value, as the unrestricted power of States to tax
will prove to be more efficacious to promote inequality than the
regulations which Congress can pass to preserve the equality of
right contemplated by the constitution among the citizens of the
several States. . . . [T]hat supreme law requires equality of burden and forbids discrimination in State6 taxation when the powers
apply to the citizens of other States.'
The Court then held that the tax in Ward violated the privileges and
immunities clause without having to decide whether it also violated
the commerce clause.
ported into any state, to any other state of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid by any state on the
property of the united states, or either of them.
9 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 908-09 (1777) (Library of Congress ed. 1907).
13 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (which provides in relevant part that "Congress shall have

Power.. . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States").
14 See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518,531-32 (1978); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1978); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
15 79 U.S. 418 (1 Wall.) (1871).
16 Id. at 429-31.
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Ownership Theory

Because the particular rights embraced by the privileges and immunities clause are not enumerated in the Constitution, the early
courts were called upon to define them. In Corfwld v. Coyell,' 7 the
court was required to determine whether nonresidents had the right
of equal access to New Jersey oyster beds. Justice Washington, recognizing a special proprietary interest of the state and its citizens in
the state's natural resources, said that the privileges and immunities
clause did not amount to a "grant of a cotenancy in the common
property of the State to the citizens of all other States."' 8 Accordingly, he held that New Jersey could limit nonresidents' access to its
oyster beds without violating the privileges and immunities clause.
This "ownership theory" surfaced again in McCready v. Vr-

g'nia.'9 In that case, the Supreme Court recognized the ownership
interest of the state and its citizens in the state's tidal waters and
sustained a statute which prohibited nonresidents from planting oysters there. The Court stated that the resources "owned" by the state
were not subject to paramount national interests, that they remained
under state control, and that the state therefore had the right, in its
discretion, to appropriate them to the use of its citizens. The Court
said that the privileges and immunities clause simply did not invest
citizens of one state with any interest in common property of citizens
of another state, and they thus could be excluded. However, in
Toomer v. Witsell, 20 the court discarded the view that "state owned"
resources were beyond the purview the privileges and immunities
clause.
B. FundamentalRights
In Corfield, Justice Washington said the privileges and immunities clause protects only those fundamental rights "which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent
and sovereign." 2 1 He indicated that the fundamental rights which
17 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
18 Id. at 552.
19 94 U.S. 391 (1877); see also Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
20 334 U.S. 385 (1947); see text accompanying note 34 infra.
21 6 F. Cas. at 551. But see Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L.
REv. 487 (1981) (immunities clause was to promote political and social cohesion and not
merely to prohibit discrimination which frustrates the formation of the union).
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are guaranteed to every person by every state may be comprehended
under several general heads:
[T]he right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to
pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to
pass through or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and. maintain actions
of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher
taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the
state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and
immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental. . . . [Tlhese
and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the
citizens of each state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated.

.

. "the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship

among the people of the different states of the
and intercourse
'22
Union."
Although Justice Washington believed nonresidents had the fundamental right to pass through or reside in a state "for purposes of
trade, agricultural or professional pursuits," he did not believe nonresidents had a fundamental right of access to a state's limited resources, even for commercial purposes.
Justice Washington interpreted the privileges and immunities
clause as guaranteeing fundamental rights to all citizens of the
Union, regardless of the rights afforded by a state to its own citizens.
23
Since that time, the law has undergone three major developments.
The first occurred in Paulv. Virginia,24 where the Court said that the
measure of rights secured to nonresidents under the privileges and
immunities clause was no more and no less than the rights afforded
by a state to its own citizens, and that "[i]t was undoubtedly the
object of the clause

. .

.

to place the citizens of each State upon the

same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages
25
resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.1
The second development occurred in Hague v. CI 0. ,26 where the
22

6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (citing portions of article IV of the Articles of Confederation).

23 See Justice Blackmun's majority opinion and Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in
Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
24 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
25 Id. at 180.
26 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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Court said that the privileges and immunities clause did not allow a
citizen to carry the rights he has in his own state into another state,
"but. . .[every] citizen of every State is to have the same privileges
and immunities which the citizens of that State enjoy. . . . [T]he
section, in effect, prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own." '2 7 According to Justice Brennan, that statement "signaled the complete demise of the Court's
acceptance of Corfield's definition of the type of rights encompassed
by the phrase 'privileges' and 'immunities.' ",28
29
The third development occurred in Austin v. New Hampshire,
where the Court indicated that the privileges and immunities clause
"establishes a norm of comity without specifying the particular subjects as to which citizens of each state coming within the jurisdiction
30
of another are guaranteed equality of treatment."
C.

SubstantialEquality

Since nonresidents are entitled to equal tax treatment under the
privileges and immunities clause, at least when they pursue commercial activities and no "state owned" resources are involved,3 1 states
attempted to justify discriminatory tax statutes by referring to other
tax statutes which burdened only residents. The state could then argue that the seemingly discriminatory statute was in fact a compensatory measure designed to achieve equality and uniformity in the
allocation of the total burden between residents and nonresidents.
In Travellers' Insurance Co. v. Connecticut,32 the Court was persuaded by such an argument. In that caise, the state imposed an ad
valorem tax on shares of stock in Connecticut corporations. The tax
imposed on resident shareholders, however, was based on the value of
stock after it had been reduced by the value of real estate upon which
real property taxes were assessed. On its face, the statute imposed a
higher tax on the stock owned by nonresidents. However, since resident shareholders paid local property taxes and nonresidents did not,
the Court upheld the statute under the privileges and immunities
clause because the tax scheme, viewed as a whole, did not discriminate against nonresidents in a meaningful way. The Court recog27
28
29
30
31
never
32

Id. at 511.
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 399 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
420 U.S. 656 (1975).
Id. at 660.
The fundamental nature of nonresidents' rights to pursue commercial activities was
disputed. State owned resources were considered exempt from the clause.
185 U.S. 364 (1902).
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nized that the privileges and immunities clause did not require
precise equality in the treatment afforded residents and nonresidents,
but that substantial equality would suffice.
In Austin v. New Hampshire,33 a state tax on income earned in the
state by nonresidents was struck down under the privileges and immunities clause. The Court found that no comparable tax was imposed on residents and that there were no taxes imposed on residents
only to offset the discriminatory tax.
D. Standardof Review
The ownership theory and the requirement for substantial
equality converged in Toomer v. W4itsell. 34 In that case, a South Carolina statute prescribed a nonresidents' license fee for shrimp boats
one hundred times the fee for residents. The state argued that the
discriminatory statute was beyond the purview of the privileges and
immunities clause since its purpose and effect was to give residents
preferred access to the shrimp, a "state owned" resource like the oysters in McCread. The Court, however, said that the ownership theory was no more than a "19th-century legal fiction" that
express[es] in legal shorthand . . . the importance to its people
that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation
of an- important resource. . . . Thus we hold that commercial
is
shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings,
35
within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause.
Even though the ownership theory would not exempt the state's
resources, the Court said that the state could "charge non-residents a
differential which would merely compensate the State for any added
enforcement burden they may impose or for any conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay."' 36 The Court said
that a statute which discriminated beyond that could be justified
under the privileges and immunities clause only if it was shown that
"noncitizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed, 3 7 and there is "a [reasonable] relationship between the
danger represented by noncitizens, as a class, and the severe discrimi33 420 U.S. 656 (1975); see also Salorio v. Glaser ("Salorio P), 82 N.J. 482, 414 A.2d 943,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874 (1980) (summary judgment), Salorio v. Glaser ("Saloo II"), 93 N.J.
447, 461 A.2d 1100, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983).
34 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
35 Id. at 402-03.
36 Id. at 399.
37 Id. at 398.
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nation practiced upon them"38 (the "Toomer test"). Since that could
not be demonstrated in Toomer, the discriminatory license fee was
held to violate the privileges and immunities clause.
IV.

Baldwin and Its Aftermath

Baldwin v.Fish and Game Commission of Montana3 9 involved a statute which prescribed fees for nonresidents' elk hunting licenses several times higher than those for residents. Based upon the
undisputed facts that the quantity of elk was finite and that nonresidents had a purely recreational interest in the elk, a deeply divided
Court 40 upheld the statute under the privileges and immunities

clause.
In reference to Corfidd, the Court stated:
Only with respect to those "privileges" and "immunities" bearing
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State
treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally. Here we
with respect to
must decide into which category falls a distinction
41
access to recreational big-game hunting.
To decide whether nonresidents' access to big game falls into a
category of protected rights, the Court embraced the pre-Toomer notion that a state "own" the wildlife within its boundaries and has the
power to preserve this bounty for its citizens alone. The Court expressly rejected the nonresidents' contention that the ownership theory had no remaining vitality.42 Unlike the decisions in Corfwld and
McCready, however, where "state owned" resources were considered
exempt from the privileges and immunities clause, the majority, citing Toomer, said that a state's interest in its resources "must yield
when, without reason, it interferes with a nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is pro'43
tected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
38 Id. at 399.
39 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
40 Chief Justice Burger (writing a separate concurring opinion) and Justices Stewart,
Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens comprised the majority. Justices Brennan, White,
and Marshall dissented.
41 436 U.S. at 383-84. But see note 21 supra.
42 436 U.S. at 384-87.
more recent years... the Court
43 Id. at 386 (citations omitted). It was noted that "[iun
has recognized that the States' interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim
to 'own' . . . is by no means absolute." Id. at 385 (citation omitted). Rather than placing a
statute completely beyond the purview of the privileges and immunities clause, a State's ownership is merely a factor to be considered in determining whether the discrimination violates
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Contrasting the nonresidents' right to pursue a recreational interest with the state's interest in preserving its elk, the Court said:
The elk supply, which has been entrusted to the care of the State
by the people of Montana, is finite and must be carefully tended
in order to be preserved.
Appellants' interest in sharing this limited resource on more
equal terms with Montana residents simply does not fall within
the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause ...
Whatever rights or activities may be "fundamental" under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, we are persuaded, and hold,
that elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is not one of
them. 44
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the
significance of Montana's special interest in its elk population. He
recognized a need to distinguish between cases in which the Toomer
test should be applied and those, like Baldwin, in which a fundamental rights analysis should be applied. He emphasized that South Carolina did not "own" the migratory shrimp in Toomer, while Montana
did "own" the elk in Baldwin because they remained primarily
within the state.45 In drawing that distinction, he seems to suggest
that the application of the fundamental rights analysis is limited to
cases involving "state owned" resources, and that the Toomer test continues to be the standard by which all other cases should be decided.
In pointing out the limits of the Court's holding in Baldwin, Chief
Justice Burger said:
The Court does not hold that the Clause permits a State to give
its residents preferred access to recreational activities offered for
sale by private parties. .

.

. The Clause assures noncitizens the

opportunity to purchase goods and services on the same basis as
citizens; it confers the same protection upon the46buyer of luxury
goods and services as upon the buyer of bread.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan said that the concept of Corfeld,
that the privileges and immunities clause protects only fundamental
rights, had properly been interred by Hague. He said that the majority superimposed the rule of Paul v. Virginia on Corfteld and emerged
with the view that a state could not deny nonresidents the fundamenthe clause. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. at 529; see also Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas,
458 U.S. 941 (1982).
44 436 U.S. at 388.
45 Id. at 392-93.
46 Id. at 394.
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tal rights it affords its own citizens, a view itself lacking in any precedential support.
Justice Brennan said that the principal concern expressed in the
Court's recent decisions "was the classification itself-the fact that
the discrimination hinged on the status of nonresidency," 47 and that
the sole issue was whether the discrimination was justified. In applying the Toomer test to the facts in Baldwin, he said that the discriminatory treatment must fail because "nothing in the record [indicated]
that the influx of nonresident hunters created a special danger to
Montana's elk or to any of its other wildlife species." Justice Brennan argued that the majority's inquiry into the fundamental nature
48
of the nonresidents' rights was misplaced.
I think the time has come to confirm explicitly that which
has been implicit in our modern privileges and immunities decisions, namely that an inquiry into whether a given right is "fundamental" has no place in our analysis of whether a State's
discrimination against nonresidents . . . violates the Clause.
Rather, our primary
concern is the State's justification for its
49
discrimination .

Any questions Baldwin raised about the vitality of the Toomer
test were resolved in Hickh'n v. Orbeck,50 which was decided a month
after Baldwin .51 The Court's opinion was written by Justice Brennan.
In Hickin, the Court invalidated an Alaska statute requiring all
oil and gas leases and easements for oil and gas pipelines to provide
that Alaska residents be hired in preference to nonresidents. While
the fundamental nature of the nonresidents' rights was undisputable,
the state attempted to invoke the ownership theory, contending that
the oil and gas was "owned" by the state and that its appropriation
was therefore subject to any terms and conditions that the state chose
to impose. The Court, however, said that "Alaska has little or no
proprietary interest in much of the activity swept within the ambit of
47 Id. at 402.
48 Id. at 403. While it was noted that the number of hunting licenses purchased by nonresidents had increased substantially in recent years, the nexus between that fact and the
requisite finding that the elk supply was overburdened because of the nonresidents was indeed tenuous. Id. at 403 n.6. If the state could establish that the elk supply was overburdened because of the nonresidents, presumably, the same result would have been reached
if it had been decided under Toomer without the need to resort to the ownership theory, a 19th
century legal principle which, to be applied, depended on the migratory habits of the particular resource involved, or to the fundamental rights concept of Corfild, a principle that was
seemingly discarded in 1939.
49 Id. at 402.
50 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
51 Hicklin was decided on June 22, 1978, Baldwin on May 23, 1978.
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[the] Alaska Hire [statute]. '5 2 Relying on various older commerce
clause cases, 53 the Court said that the ownership theory did not apply
to natural resources destined for interstate commerce, like the oil and
gas in Hicklin .54
The Court applied the Toomer test to determine whether the discrimination was justified under the privileges and immunities clause.
While the statute was aimed at reducing unemployment, a valid
state interest, no showing was made that Alaska's unemployment was
attributable to an influx of nonresident job seekers or that nonresidents otherwise constituted a peculiar source of that evil. Instead,
the record indicated that a substantial number of Alaska's jobless residents were 'unemployed because they lacked education and job
training. Furthermore, even if a showing were made that nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of that evil, the Court said the
statute would still fail because the discrimination did not bear a substantial relationship to the danger represented by nonresidents, since
55
preference was extended to all residents, not just unemployed ones.
V.

One Test or Two?

Prior to Baldwin, any tax statute which discriminated against
nonresidents in a manner that did not promote substantial equality
under the tax scheme viewed as a whole, and which did not merely
compensate the state for any added enforcement burden, was in constitutional jeopardy. Unless it was aimed at an evil of which nonresidents constituted a peculiar source, such as over-burdened resources,
the statute could not pass muster under Toomer.
The fundamental rights limitation on the applicability of the
privileges and immunities clause, however, provides states the opportunity to avoid the rigid Toomer test. In Baldwin, the fundamental
rights analysis relieved the state of the need to demonstrate that the
elk supply actually was overburdened by nonresidents. 5 6 According
to Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Baldwin, it is appropriate to relieve the state of that requirement if it is found to "own"
the resources.5 7 If the fundamental rights analysis is limited to cases
involving "state owned" resources, its applicability to state property
52 437 U.S. at 529.
53 Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
54

437 U.S. at 533.

55
56
57

Id. at 527-28.
See text accompanying note 48 supra.
436 U.S. at 392.
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tax cases may exist only in theory since such taxes are rarely, if ever,
imposed in connection with state resources. 58
The Court did not discuss the fundamental rights analysis in
Hick/in. Instead, it cited Ward for the proposition that the privileges
and immunities clause protects nonresidents in plying their trade.
Perhaps the Court thought it was unnecessary to discuss the analysis
because the fundamental nature of nonresidents' rights to pursue employment in a state was a foregone conclusion. On the other hand,
the Court may not have applied the analysis because it had determined that the ownership theory did not apply to the oil and gas in
Hicklin as it did to the elk in Baldwin. It is perhaps for that reason
that lower courts have expressed uncertainty as to the necessity of a
59
determination that equality in taxation is a fundamental right.

If the Court considers the Toomer test and the fundamental
rights analysis mutually exclusive, its application of the Toomer test in
Hicklin, where nonresidents' undisputable fundamental rights were
at issue, may suggest that the fundamental rights analysis was not
reached because the ownership theory did not apply to the particular
resources involved. This reading of the case would suggest that the
fundamental rights analysis applies only in conjunction with the
ownership theory; it would rarely, if ever, arise in state property tax
cases.60 Under this rationale, discriminatory state property taxes
must satisfy the stringent Toomer test to pass muster under the privileges and immunities clause.
58 Although property taxes are rarely imposed in connection with limited resources of the
state, it is not inconceivable. Consider the commuter tax and the state's inadequate transportation facilities in Salorio v. Glaser ("Salorio I"), 82 N.J. 482, 414 A.2d 943, cert. denied, 449
U.S. 874 (1980)(summary judgment), Salorio v. Glaser ("Salorio I"), 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d
1100, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983), and the license fee for boats and the shortage of the
state's mooring facilities in Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities, 651 F.2d 661
(9th Cir. 1981). It may be questioned whether the state-created jobs were "state owned"
resources in Salla v. County of Monroe, 64 A.D.2d 437, 409 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1978), afd, 48
N.Y.2d 514, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 399 N.E.2d 909 (1979), cert. denied sub nom. Abrams v. Salla,
446 U.S. 909 (1980), and in Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of
Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1981), rev'd on other grounds sub noa. White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983). The same question may be raised
whether real property taxes on the state's limited ocean frontage involves "state owned"
resources.
59 In Taylor v. Conta, 106 Wis. 2d 321, 335, 316 N.W.2d 814, 822 (1982), the court
declared that "[in the wake of Baldwin and Hicklin the necessity of a determination that
equality in taxation is a fundamental right is unclear." In Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water
Transp. Facilities, 651 F.2d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 1981)(citation omitted), the court entertained,
but rejected, the contention that "in light of Hicklin V. Orbeck,. .. Baldwin is no longer good
law."
60 See note 58 supra and accompanying text.

[Vol. 59:878]

PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS

The Court applied the ownership theory in Baldwin, but it was
not required to decide whether the fundamental rights analysis
should ever be applied independently of it. Since the Court held in
Baldwin that nonresidents had no fundamental right to pursue recreational elk hunting on the same terms as residents, it was not required to decide whether the Toomer test should ever be applied in
conjunction with the properly invoked ownership theory. Consequently, any guidance in determining whether the Court considers
the Toomer test and the fundamental rights analysis to be mutually
exclusive must be inferred.
Justice Brennan's position appears to be that the Toomer test is
the standard by which the validity of every discriminatory statute is
to be judged. Chief Justice Burger apparently believes that the fundamental rights analysis is proper for cases involving "state owned"
resources, and that the Toomer test is to be used in others. The majority in Baldwin also emphasized the state's "ownership" interest in the
elk in applying the fundamental rights analysis. Because the fundamental rights analysis originated with the ownership theory in
Corfield, and historically has not been applied independently of the
ownership theory, such a limitation may have been contemplated by
the Court.
Noting in Baldwin that "a State's interest in its wildlife and
other resources must yield when, without reason, it interferes with a
nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood, '' 61 the Court may have
suggested that a lesser standard of review should be applied since the
Toomer test requires considerably more than rational grounds for discriminating against nonresidents.
Justice O'Connor, on the other hand, apparently believes that
the fundamental rights analysis and the Toomer test may coexist comfortably, since the former determines the applicability of the privi61 436 U.S. at 386 (emphasis added). The Court's statement raises doubt as to what
reasons would suffice. However, the Toomer test (nonresidents must constitute a peculiar
source of evil at which the statute is aimed and there must be a reasonable relationship between the danger presented by nonresidents, as a class, and the discrimination practiced upon
them) requires much more than "some" reason for the discrimination. The Court, in United
Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1029 (1984), noted
that the privileges and immunities clause "does not preclude discrimination. . . where there
is a 'substantial reason' for the difference in treatment." In various circumstances, a number
of courts have held that a rational basis standard of review should be applied. See, e.g., Taylor v. Conta, 106 Wis. 2d 321, 316 N.W.2d 814 (1982); Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233
(Utah 1979); Rubin v. Glaser, 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382, appealdisrn'sed,449 U.S. 977 (1980).
Cf Salorio v. Glaser, ("Salorio 1'), 82 N.J. 482, 414 A.2d 943, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 874
(1980) (summary judgment), Salorio v. Glaser ("Salorio II"), 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d 1100, cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983)(substantial relationship standard applied).
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leges and immunities clause, while the latter concerns the state's
justification for the discriminatory treatment once the privileges and
immunities clause is found to apply. 62 She apparently interprets the
majority's opinion in Baldwin as according little or no weight to the
state's "ownership" interest in the elk.
A.

Do Nonresidents Have a FundamentalRzght to Equal Taxation?

Once the fundamental rights analysis is determined to apply in
a state property tax case (either because the tax relates to a "state
owned" resource or because this analysis is ultimately held to apply
in all cases), the question then becomes whether the nonresidents'
interest in an exemption from higher taxes or impositions on their
recreational properties is a fundamental right.
In Baldwin, the Court indicated that the privileges and immunities clause prohibits states from exercising their legislative powers in a
manner that interferes with the rights of nonresidents and bears upon
the vitality of the nation as a single entity. While a discriminatory
tax or imposition on nonresidents' commercial activities or commercial properties interferes with rights protected by the privileges and
immunities clause, the Court upheld a discriminatory license fee in
Baldwin that was imposed on nonresidents' recreational activities.
Implicitly, the Court held that nonresidents do not have a fundamental right to equal taxes or impositions per se, and that their right
to equal treatment depends on the fundamental nature of the activities with respect to which they are imposed.
Some courts have said that the right to acquire and own recreational property is not a fundamental right. In Baker v. Matheson ,63 for
example, the Utah Supreme Court said that the right of nonresident
homeowners and renters to the same tax treatment afforded resident
homeowners and renters was not a fundamental right because it was
not of the "same magnitude of importance as the right to engage in a
'64
legitimate vocation for income essential to the maintenance of life."
62 See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring). In interpreting the majority opinion in this manner, O'Connor effectively reduced to dicta the Court's
emphasis on the state's "ownership" interest in its wildlife. See also Laborers Local Union No.
374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 654 P.2d 67 (1982); Salorio v. Glaser ("Salorio
II"), 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d 1100, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 486 (1983); Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 425 N.E.2d 346 (Mass. 1981), rev'd sub nom.
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983). Cf.
United States v. Felter, 546 F. Supp. 1002 (C.D. Utah 1982); Tangier Sound Watermen's
Ass'n v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287 (E.D. Va. 1982).
63 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).
64 Id. at 247; see also Godfrey v. Montana State Fish & Game Comm'n, 631 P.2d 1265
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This opinion, however, can hardly be reconciled with Justice Washington's view that fundamental rights include the right to acquire
and possess property "of every kind, '6 5 or with Chief Justice Burger's
view that the privileges and immunities clause protects purchasers of
luxury goods and recreational activities, except where "state owned"
66
resources are involved.
B.

Standardof Review for FundamentalRzghts

If the fundamental rights analysis is determined to apply and
the rights of nonresidents are held not to be fundamental, the privileges and immunities clause will not invalidate a statute, however
invidious the discrimination it works against nonresidents. If nonresidents' rights are held to be fundamental, the privileges and immunities clause will apply, but discrimination against them is permissible
if it is justified. The standard of review by which a discriminatory
tax statute must be tested under the fundamental rights analysis is
unclear, but the Court may have intimated that a less stringent standard than the Toomer test is appropriate. 6 7 If the fundamental rights
analysis is to be limited to cases involving "state owned" resources, a
less stringent standard of review may be warranted.
In some cases, lower courts have applied the lower, rational basis
standard of review to test discriminatory tax statutes, but not in con68 In Taylor v. Conta,69
junction with the fundamental rights analysis.
for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a discriminatory
(Mont. 1981) (The denial of a nonresident fishing outfitter's license renewal application does
not involve fundamental rights.); Kuhn v. Vergiels, 558 F. Supp. 24 (D. Nev. 1982) (The right
to participate in a state administered professional education financial assistance program is
not fundamental.).
65 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)(No. 3,230); see note 22
supra and accompanying text; see also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
66 Indeed, the assurance that the privileges and immunities clause would be applied to
noncommercial situations was probably among the objectives of the drafters of the Constitution in bifurcating article IV of the Articles of Confederation between the commerce clause
and the privileges and immunities clause.
67 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948); see note 48 supra.
68 In none of these cases was the application of the rational basis standard of review
predicated on a determination that Baldwin prescribed that standard in conjunction with the
fundamental rights analysis. Instead, those courts interpreted Toomer as requiring only a rational basis standard of review. In Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979), the court
inquired into the nature of nonresidents' rights to equal taxation, held they were not fundamental, and then applied a rational basis standard of review. If the fundamental rights analysis had applied and the rights were held not to be fundamental, the privileges and
immunities clause would not apply. In that case, no justification under any standard of review would have been required.
69 106 Wis. 2d 321, 316 N.W.2d 814 (1982).
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tax scheme requiring taxpayers moving out of the state to include,
for state income tax purposes, the gains they realized on the sale of
their old residence in the state. Taxpayers remaining in the state
were allowed to exclude such gains. The tax scheme also denied deductions for moving expenses if the taxpayer moved out of state. The
court said that under Toomer, the "test for constitutionality is whether
the means employed bear a substantial relation to legitimate state
objectives. '70 It then found two legitimate state objectives to which
the discrimination was substantially related:
First, the legislature was concerned that unless the gain was taxed
immediately the state would lose jurisdiction to tax the gain realized on the sale of the Wisconsin residence when the taxpayer left
the state. Second, the legislature was concerned with the administrative problems to the state and to the former residents which
would arise if the state were forced to keep track of the former
of the "deferred gain" was concluresidents until the 7taxability
1
sively determined.
In Baker v. Matheson,72 a Utah statute was upheld under this
lower standard of review. Refunds of general fund revenues were
allowed for resident homeowners and renters but not for nonresident
homeowners and renters who also had contributed to the fund. The
court said that such discrimination against nonresidents is not barred
per se if it furthers "a legitimate state interest to which the classification is reasonably related."'7 3 Since the discriminatory treatment was
"reasonably related to alleviating the increased costs of living produced in part by increased property taxes," 74 it was sustained.
70 316 N.W.2d at 824.
71 Id. at 825. Since these legislative concerns involve only the state's ability to collect,
without administrative problems, the tax imposed on nonresidents, the sustainability of the
discriminatory tax under even the rational basis standard of review is dubious. Note also that
the court presumes that the gains deferred by residents will eventually be recognized. However, if recognition for state tax purposes depends on recognition for federal tax purposes, this
will generally not be the case. I.R.C. § 121 allows the exclusion of $125,000 of gain for individuals over age 55. I.R.C. § 121 (West Supp. 1983). I.R.C. § 1014(a) provides for a
stepped-up basis in property acquired from a decedent. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (West Supp. 1983).
Consequently, no gains will be recognized if the resident defers recognition under I.R.C.
§ 1034 until he attains age 55 or dies. I.R.C. § 1034 (West Supp. 1983).
72 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979).
73 Id. at 247. The court cited Toomer and Hicklin as authority for this proposition after
determining that the right of nonresidents to equal tax treatment was not a fundamental
right under Baldwin because the benefits were not of the "same magnitude of importance as
the right to engage in legitimate vocation for income essential to the maintenance of life."
Id.; see notes 64 and 68 supra.
74 607 P.2d at 247. Even if, as the court held, a legitimate state interest is furthered when
residents are protected from the additional tax burden, that would be true of every tax that
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In Rubin v. Glaser,75 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a
statute providing rebates of taxes paid on properties constituting the
taxpayer's primary residence, but not for nonresidents who paid such
taxes on their summer homes in the state. The court said that "state
taxing statutes, conferring-a benefit or advantage on residents, do not
run afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, provided they
bear a 'close' or 'substantial' relationship to a legitimate purpose independent of discrimination against nonresidents. ' 76 In finding that
the rebate was a means to assist "the taxpayer in times of escalating
property taxes to keep a roof over his head, ' 77 and that "[t]he Legislature did not intend to foster ownership of property for a second
home to be used for vacations or for purposes other than maintaining
a principal residence,

' 78

the court held that a legitimate state pur-

pose was furthered by the discrimination and that it was therefore
79
justified under the privileges and immunities clause.
VI.

Conclusion

If the fundamental rights analysis of Baldwin is limited to cases
involving "state owned" resources, its application to state property
tax cases is doubtful since such taxes are rarely, if ever, imposed in
respect to such resources. If the fundamental rights analysis does not
apply, a discriminatory tax statute will be tested by Toomer.
To be justified under Toomer, the state must demonstrate that
nonresidents constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the statute
was aimed. Discriminatory taxes that are not imposed with respect
to overburdened state resources will probably not satisfy the Toomer
test, since the state will not be able to demonstrate the existence of
any evil of which nonresidents constitute a peculiar source. Consequently, a discriminatory state property tax will generally pass constitutional muster only if the Supreme Court ultimately holds (1)
that the fundamental rights analysis is not limited to cases involving
discriminates against nonresidents. Such a justification attempts to legitimize all discriminatory taxes so as to render all constitutional limitations merely academic.
75 83 N.J. 299, 416 A.2d 382 (1980).
76 Id. at 386. Hicklin and Toomer were cited in support of that proposition.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See also Maland v. Commissioner, 331 N.W.2d 486 (Minn. 1983) (state inheritance tax
marital exemption available only to residents upheld); Lung v. O'Chesky, 94 N.M. 802, 617
P.2d 1317, 1320 (1980) (state permitted to make distinctions between residents and nonresidents in respect to a program of grocery and medical expense rebates, since the distinction
was "rationally related to a legitimate state purpose" of granting relief from gross receipts and
property taxes to low income individuals who actually pay those taxes). 617 P.2d at 1320.
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"state owned" resources, and (2) that nonresidents' rights to exemptions from higher taxes on their recreational properties are not fundamental, or, if fundamental, that the discrimination may be
justified by a rational basis standard of review.
Since the Court was not required to address those concerns in
Baldwin, that case is of limited aid to the state in justifying a discriminatory property tax. However, in cases involving tax preferences afforded residents in respect to their permanent homes, the state may
have another, albeit untested, argument. If the tax preference is an
exemption or rebate of taxes imposed on property constituting the
taxpayer's principal residence, the state may argue that any discrimination does not "hinge on" but is merely "incidental to" the status of
nonresidency. Even Justice Brennan acknowledges that incidental
discrimination against nonresidents is generally not entitled to constitutional protection. 0 Although such tax preferences are necessarily
limited to those having their "permanent residence" within the state,
any disparate treatment is due to the failure of the particular property to satisfy the definition of "permanent residence." Residents'
properties which fail to satisfy those definitional requirements are
taxed in exactly the same manner as nonresidents' properties. While
nonresidents may never be able to satisfy the requirements for such
preferential tax treatment, neither will residents who rent their
homes and pay property taxes indirectly through their landlords.
Furthermore, no resident could ever own more than one property
entitled to the benefit.
Tax preferences afforded one property only are distinguishable
from those afforded residents on all properties of a particular type.,'
The denial of benefits in the latter case is due solely to the owner's
nonresident status. The benefit attaches to the person, rather than
the property, and therefore hinges on his residency status. Where the
benefit attaches to a particular property, however, and residents are
treated in the same manner as nonresidents, any discrimination attendant upon nonresidents' inability to own such property is arguably incidental and permissible under the privileges and immunities
clause.
80 See text accompanying note 47 supra.
81 See, for example, the Florida statute, which exempts from tangible personal property
taxes all household goods and personal effects of "every person residing and making his or her
permanent home in this state." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.181 (West 1971). "Household goods"
are defined as "[w]earing apparel, furniture, appliances, and other items ordinarily found in
... Id. § 191.001(11)(a).
the home and used for the comfort of the owner and his family.

